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FRIENDLY FIRE AND CASUALTIES OF THE
WAR ON CRIME
Albert J. Krieger*
The differences between the real and the theoretical world
vary according to the perceptions of the viewer. The lawyer,
working in the well, sees the limitations upon vigorous representa-
tion much differently from the prosecutor, and all too frequently,
the judge. As the "war against crime" has grown in political im-
portance, and as legislators, as well as executives, have vied with
each other to demonstrate unrelenting intention to rid communi-
ties of their criminals, the fallout from the rhetoric has adversely
affected individual liberties directly and indirectly.
Unquestionably our society suffers from the predation of the
criminal. As a result, our life-styles have markedly changed. Not
too long ago, at least as anecdotal history goes, household doors
were left unlocked and keys were left in the ignition of the family
car. Today the burglar alarm is a necessity, be it on the car or at
home, and rare is the outer door without a deadbolt or pickproof
lock or both. As well, the parks in urban areas were once the re-
treat of those confined to the city, not a place of darkness and fear.
Neighborhood streets, once a playground, are now called combat
zones by the locals and much worse by others. The police officer
on routine patrol wears body armor-the flak jacket. There really
can be no counterargument to the thesis that the endemic of crime
within all of our communities is responsible for these attitudes and
these self-protective acts-and society knows it. A lawyer cannot
allow self-adoration to preclude recognition of the simple fact that
by representing the accused, the lawyer is deemed to have em-
braced those who are the cause of the disquietingly accelerated
heartbeat in the law-abiding citizen. The constitutional mandate
to represent the accused may satisfy those within the profession,
but offers little solace to a population cowering behind barred
windows and locked doors. This is not a new phenomenon, but its
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effect is being compounded nationally and internationally by the
efforts of law enforcement to deal with both crime in the streets
and transnational crime.
Lawmakers and prosecutors, impatient to achieve their goal of
ending crime, have permitted the "war" mentality to direct them
to enact and enforce laws destructive of individual freedoms and
to conceive of prosecutions that disrupt valued basic freedoms.
Limiting habeas corpus, as new legislation provides,' may restrict
access to the courts, execute some sooner than otherwise, yet
makes no one safer on the streets. However, it does support those
who seek to appear "tough on crime." Depriving the criminal of
profits has a similar acceptability and resists rational arguments to
the contrary. Courts have written glibly of the Rolls-Royce law-
yer,2 that the accused criminal is not constitutionally entitled to
such, particularly if the fees are paid with proceeds from crime.
The superficial good sense of this proposition conceals the mis-
chief that lurks in its application.
It does make sense that if a criminal is deprived of profit, he
or she might feel that the whole venture is worthless. Such con-
clusion, if the calculus is right, should lead to the decision not to
commit crimes. Unfortunately, again in real life as opposed to the
theoretical, the analysis is flawed. People commit crimes for the
current gratification as much as for any other reason. The proof is
in the criminal living as the ultimate wastrel and spendthrift. The
exceptional criminal is the saver and the planner for the future.
The thrill of the crime is an end unto itself. Taking away the profit
presupposes the existence of the asset at the time of the prosecu-
tion. The uncollected fines that have been levied are figures that
equate with the budget appropriated for the operation of federal
agencies. This does not lead inexorably to the abandonment of
forfeiture or fines. Instead, it is an argument in favor of an
evaluation of whether our goals to live in a peaceable and free so-
ciety are being frustrated by the means used for its attainment.
The right to counsel, as an example, is being altered, warped,
or limited, depending upon one's perspective. Unarguably, coun-
sel, when called upon to represent a person accused of crime, must
1. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1214.
2. Just as a defendant cannot obtain a Rolls-Royce with the fruits of a crime,




be creative, honorable, skilled, courageous, and independent. The
dedication to the interests of the client must prevail against what-
ever powers the opposing side may possess. The lawyer must also
be immune to public opprobrium for appearing on behalf of an
object of general revulsion, be it the client or the crime.
The Anglo-Saxon heritage of the independent lawyer, which is
a concept to treasure, was perhaps best expressed in litigation that
crosses the Atlantic Ocean and interlocks England and the United
States. The year was 1792 and the defendant in the case was one
of the greatest voices of individual liberty that the world has ever
heard, Thomas Paine.3 The lawyer who defended him was proba-
bly one of the most brilliant of barristers that England has ever
produced, Thomas Erskine. When it was learned that Thomas
Paine, who was charged with sedition, had sought his services,
Thomas Erskine was told by his friends, by his colleagues, and by
the court that he should not endanger his career by representing
an individual as politically reprehensible as Thomas Paine. In
Guild Hall, Thomas Erskine, in response to a question put to him
by Lord Kenyon, the Lord Chief Justice, concerning why he was
representing someone such as Thomas Paine,4 responded:
I will for ever and at all hazards assert the dignity,
independence and integrity of the English Bar, without
which impartial justice, the most valuable part of the
English constitution, can have no existence.
From the moment that any advocate can be permit-
ted to say he will or will not stand between the Crown and
the subject arraigned in the Court where he daily sits to
practise-from that moment the liberties of England are
at an end."
The question that the practicing criminal defense lawyer must
ask is whether the independence that has been the rod and the
staff of the advocate has been, and continues to be, eroded by our
times, our troubles, and our fears. Enterprise-based prosecutions
and new crimes such as money laundering have interfered with the
traditional functioning of the defense counsel in ways inimical to
historic concepts of the relationship between lawyer and client.
The former prompts a hindsight review of a lawyer's activities that
replaces independence with constraining caution while the latter
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intrudes directly upon the economic survival of the legal profes-
sion.
Money is an important component of all our lives. Criminal
defense lawyers envision themselves, and justifiably so, in the
words of the motto of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, as "Liberty's Last Champion." To function as such
champions, lawyers need the means by which to live. In order to
live, they must be paid fees. It once was that criminals, successful
until arrested, could retain lawyers and pay them the fees to which
they were entitled. Except for taxes, the lawyers had no account-
ability to the prosecution or the government. Then, those self-
same lawyers could devote themselves, as opportunities offered, to
defense of the indigent and to pro bono work of every type, sort,
and description. That was, however, yesterday when the freedom
of the professional to serve society was not limited by the war
against the criminal and against crime.
The benefits derived from socially sensitive decisions such as
Gideon v. Wainright,6 Argersinger v. Hamlin,7 and resulting stat-
utes such as the Criminal Justice Act of 19648 fulfill the overriding
social contract that the justice system has with the people. Neither
the decisions nor the statutes should be considered as substitutes
for the persona and the attributes of the practitioner. The tail
wags the dog when the evaluation of the protections of the indi-
vidual incorporated in the right to counsel are measured against
the yardstick of a conviction already obtained. The mischief in the
doctrine of harmless error then contorts high principle into prag-
matic disposition. Certainly, technical error should not always
stand as a barrier between the rational and just end of the process
of prosecution for crime and the needs of a public to be both se-
cure in its being and to have the means to enforce its rights. With-
out the lawyer, the citizen is relegated to the whims of the benevo-
lent despot and the unaccountable bureaucrat. Therefore, the
tests for counsel, as in the competency of counsel cases,9 views the
6. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that an indigent defendant's right to court-
appointed counsel in criminal proceedings is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
7. 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that without a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or felony, unless represented by counsel).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. 1996).
9. The leading cases are United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)
(examining the circumstances surrounding the representation provided to determine
[Vol. 30:49
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needs of the public through the wrong lens. The people areenti-
tled to the preservation of their inherent rights, which should be
nurtured, respected, and fostered as those conventionally ex-
pressed. Unfortunately, it seems necessary to remind our govern-
ment, including our courts, that the ultimate law today is expressed
in the words of the Ninth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."'" To use what is harmless error as a guide is to set as con-
trolling the last case dealing with the last erroneous act by the
prosecution or the court. To put it another way, such decisions
ratchet down our aspirations of justice as defined in our history.
Freedom and liberty remain hostage to the pragmatism of an im-
perfect process. The role of the lawyer is one that is in constant
tension with law enforcement, or such corrosively confusing con-
cepts as "the search for the truth."
In one of the few times that the United States Supreme Court
has addressed this concept, Justices Potter Stewart and John M.
Harlan joined in the partial concurrence and partial dissent of Jus-
tice Byron R. White to the majority opinion in United States v.
Wade.' They stated that law enforcement has a clear duty to
make "the criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the
true facts surrounding the commission of the crime. 1 2 However,
they were quick to point out that the defense counsel has a differ-
ent agenda that is inherent in the adversary system itself.
13
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to as-
certain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a dif-
ferent mission. He must be and is interested in prevent-
ing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary
plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his client
whether he is innocent or guilty. The State has the obli-
gation to present the evidence. Defense counsel need
present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He
need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information
if such representation was adequate), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (holding that representation is adequate if it is reasonably effective given the
totality of the circumstances).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
11. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
12. Id. at 256 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
13. Id. (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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to help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a wit-
ness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disad-
vantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal
course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent per-
mits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's
case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he
thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are
some limits which defense counsel must observe but more
often than not, defense counsel will cross-examine a
prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he
thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will at-
tempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In this
respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as
part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense
counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in
many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for
truth. 4
The lawyer renders services that are multifaceted. "'Of all
[of] the rights that an accused person has, the right to be repre-
sented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his
ability to assert any other rights he may have."" 5 No formulation
of the right to counsel since the decision in Powell v. Alabama6
has failed to describe the right to counsel in terms of the effective-
ness of counsel. To put it another way, the right to counsel should
not be a paper tiger. "The right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case
to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing."' 7
Many who are exposed to the daily workings of the criminal
justice process believe that the fangs and claws that marked the
ritual combat of trial have been blunted by the perceived threat of
the lawyer becoming a casualty in the war on crime. There are
predators within our communities, and we need protection from
them. What we do not need, however, is a resort to responses as
radical and reckless as-in the words of the aged, but apt apho-
rism-burning down the house to get rid of the cockroaches. That
14. Id- at 256-58 (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
15. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Shaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
16. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in-
cludes a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel).
. 17. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656.
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is where we may be if the perception of many defense lawyers is
correct.
Current prosecutions have focused, at least in part, on the ap-
pearance of representation as equating with conclusions of com-
plicity with the client in crime. In a case currently awaiting trial, a
lawyer is accused of conspiring with members of a criminal enter-
prise by seeking bail for a newly retained client. According to the
indictment, the lawyer was carrying out a plan for that client to ab-
scond. In another case a lawyer was accused of money laundering
when he forwarded some of the moneys that he had received from
the client to the client's new lawyer. The first lawyer withdrew
from representation because of a concern about an appearance of
conflicted representation. Still yet another case holds a lawyer to
an amorphous test to determine the source of funds used to pay
the fee to avoid fee forfeiture, if not money laundering charges.
In a situation which could well be occurring in many offices
now, a potential client seeks to hire a lawyer. The counsel re-
quests a retainer and receives $15,000 in cash delivered by an in-
dividual who supplies identification sufficient for the lawyer to file
a completed Form 8300 pursuant to section 60501 of the Internal
Revenue Code. The lawyer realizes that there is an impediment
and hazard in accepting moneys that are the proceeds of criminal
activity. Nevertheless, there are no guidelines in existence that tell
the lawyer the nature, the scope, or the intensity of the inquiry re-
quired as to the source of the money. The lawyer has no power to
compel testimony or to direct the production of records. Experi-
ence teaches that the more pressing the inquiry, the more damage
to the attorney-client relationship. The client will find it difficult
to trust the lawyer who is unwilling to accept the client's assertion
that the money comes from untainted sources. Indications of dis-
belief will send the client, at the very least, looking for a lawyer
more accepting, less suspicious, or even unsophisticated. In this
hypothesis the lawyer may be greeted with the simple denial of
wrongdoing and an assertion that the fee comes from family funds.
For the lawyer to respond that affirmative proof is necessary to
demonstrate that the money is not crime-generated transmits a
disbelief and mistrust of the client. This creates an unleapable
hurdle to the interchange of confidences that is the working core
18. There are more than subtle differences between 18 U.S.C. § 1956 and 18
U.S.C. § 1957. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1994).
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of the attorney-client relationship. If, by some happenstance, the
relationship survives, the lawyer is haunted by the ghost of a prob-
able investigation that will drift through the unchartable backwa-
ters of what someone else thinks the lawyer should have known.
Another problem may arise when the lawyer passes on infor-
mation to which the client is nominally entitled and is charged with
obstruction of justice, or worse. The lawyer, who identifies a wit-
ness, or who publicly pursues information gathering about a wit-
ness, may be viewed as placing that person in harm's way and
knowingly and willfully committing such an act. Doubly damned
is the lawyer if the prosecution views the client as "dangerous."
The conclusion, then, is inescapable. The government may well
feel that such a lawyer has aided and abetted the interests of the
criminal enterprise, and, by definition, has participated in the af-
fairs of the enterprise, to and for the benefit of the enterprise-a
criminal act.19 These examples may appear extreme, but they are
not hallucinatory.
Knowledge is power, pundits have said. Knowledge is also a
key element of the criminal lexicon. However, what a lawyer
"knows" means different things to different people. The defense
lawyer is disciplined to match knowledge with close to incontro-
vertible fact; the prosecution, viewing the same evidentiary land-
scape, sees mountains where the defense lawyer sees hills. Neither
may be right, but are not wrong. It all goes back to the percep-
tions of the viewer. However, it is the lawyer representing the de-
fendant who is at risk, for the power wielded by the prosecution
can destroy. No one wants to be the subject of an investigation,
certainly not a defendant in a criminal case. Judge Learned Hand
allegedly said that he feared being a defendant more than death or
a disabling disease. In order to avoid being answerable in a world
of increasing inquiry, criminal defense attorneys will reasonably
search for a smoother path and less troubled waters. Thus, law-
yers, in general, are refusing criminal cases, and specialists within
the field are looking for greener pastures. The societal effect is as-
tronomically greater than merely the economic livelihood of the
bar. The winds of this change are eroding the practitioner's cour-
age and independence. Whether the lawyer feels the purse strings
tugged by a court faced with budget constraints, or the impatience




of a prosecutor, or the fear of misunderstanding of motive, ethics,
or intent, the result is the same. As Justice White said, the law-
yer's defense of the client may well have "little, if any, relation to
the search for truth."' This very defense requires courage and
dedication and perseverance regardless of the appearance of disre-
gard for the truth. This is precisely the kind of situation that
prosecutors of good intention and judges of temperate reaction
may misunderstand in the heat of litigation, and again, the power
to hurt is in the court and the prosecutor. Therefore, reason lures
the lawyer into thinking that the fight is not worth the candle, and
that last bit of effort, that driving desire to win, is not given to the
client. The criminal justice system does not care because the cal-
endar has moved, and the quality of representation exceeded the
low water marks of either Cronic or Strickland, but some unfortu-
nates have been betrayed-by all of us.
There is more to fear from a government that quiets the voices
of those who have made it accountable in the only place where the
average citizen participates in the ongoing affairs of its society, the
courtroom, than from the periodic depredations of street thugs,
though both can make life miserable for the law-abiding. The loss
of the advocate, for whatever reason, is a loss of individual liberty.
20. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
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